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INTRODUCTION

In the recent showdown between two South Carolina Supreme Court justices
for the position of chief justice, the failures of South Carolina's legislative
judicial election system were thrust to the forefront of public discourse.I In one
corner was the current chief justice and former legislator, Jean Hoefer Toal; in
the other corner was current associate justice and former public defender, Costa
M. Pleicones.2 While Chief Justice Toal may prove the catalyst for reform, this
highly contested election highlighted the blurred line between the legislative and
judicial branches. 3 An observer of South Carolina judicial politics-and this

1. Cindi Ross Scoppe, Op-Ed., ChiefJustice Race About More than Pleicones v. Toal, THE
STATE, Nov. 7, 2013, at A6, available at http://www.thestate.com/2013/11/07/3081753/scoppemore-at-stake-in-chief.html.
2.
Corey Hutchins, State Supreme Court Chief Justice Toal to Face Rare Opponent,
CHARLESTON CITY PAPER, Aug. 9, 2013, http://www.charlestoncitypaper.com/TheBattery/
archives/2013/08/08/race-for-supreme-court-justice-set-for-this-winter.
3.
See John Monk, Toal-Pleicones A High Stakes Game of Thrones, THE STATE, Jan. 26,
2014, at Al, available at http://www.thestate.com/2014/01/25/3227178/game-of-thrones-toal-
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race in particular noted that "the mind reels at where even the most honest and
well-intentioned justices might be tempted to go when they meet behind closed
doors with legislators who have votes to provide them ... and requests to make
of them."4 Most judicial elections in South Carolina are decided before a formal
election even takes place. This election, however, was unprecedented because it
marked the first time a sitting chief justice ran opposed for reelection since the
1800s. 6 While the nature of this election will likely reveal other issues in the
already troubled judicial system, neither candidate expected third-party spending
to influence the election's outcome.
In 1996, South Carolina reformed its judicial elections and sought to remedy
four specifically identified problem areas: the impact of prior legislative
experience, the impact of a candidate's race, the impact of a candidate's gender,
and the number of candidates running for judicial office.8 But this reform
proved unsuccessful in remedying these issues, failing to fully restore public
confidence in the judiciary or alter the public's perception of the judiciary as a
"good-old-boy" system.9 Therefore, South Carolina should eliminate the 1996
system and move to an appointment with life tenure model based on the
gubernatorial appointment model, which involves legislative confirmation of
gubernatorial appointees. Specifically, South Carolina courts and the General
Assembly should alter the judicial selection model to conform to the original
intent of the Framers of the United States, as evidenced in the FederalistPapers

pleicones.html. State Senator Greg Gregory's remarks that "[a] lot of senators are terrified of this
race" and "[s]ome of their professions are tied to it" highlighted the blurred lines between the
South Carolina General Assembly and the state's judiciary. Id. The line between the legislative and
judicial branches will remain blurred, however, as Chief Justice Toal-a former legislator herselfwas reelected to the position in a race that came down to politics. See John Monk, Toal Victorious
in HistoricDuel: S.C. ChiefJustice Race, THE STATE, Feb. 6, 2014, at Al [hereinafter Monk, Toal
Victorious in Historic Duel], available at http://www.thestate.com/2014/02/05/3246421/toal-winshistoric-duel-for-sc.html.
4.
Scoppe, supra note 1.
5.
John Monk, Pleicones vs. Toal in Supreme Court Chief Justice Race, THE STATE, June
25, 2013, at A5, available at http://www.thestate.com/2013/06/24/2832791/justice-pleicones-willface-toal.html ("Usually, elections are settled by quiet agreements between justices on succession,
as well as lobbying behind the scenes to get enough votes from lawmakers so there doesn't have to
be an election."); Hutchins, supra note 2.
6.
Scoppe, supra note 1.
7.
Corey Hutchins, Could Dark Money Influence Rare Election for S.C. Supreme Court
Chief Justice?, FREETIMES (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.free-times.com/news/could-dark-moneyinfluence-rare-election-for-s.c.-supreme-court-chief-justi.
However, South Carolina remains
incredibly unregulated in the area of third-party spending. Hutchins, supra note 2. Furthermore,
special interest groups such as the General Assembly's Black Caucus played a large role in Chief
Justice Toal's reelection, as she received thirty-one of the thirty-six members' votes. See Monk,
Toal Victorious in HistoricDuel, supra note 3.
8.
James H. Ritchie, Jr., The JudicialMerit Selection Commission: History of the JMSC and
the Screening Process for Judges in this State, S.C. LAW., July-Aug. 2006, at 26, 30.
9.
See infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
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and the separation of powers doctrine underlying the U.S. Constitution. 10 A
transition to this model would ensure that South Carolina courts remain a tool of
countermajoritarian policies when appropriate. Additionally, a transition to this
appointment model may restore the public's confidence in the state judiciary.
America's distrust of the judiciary and all other forms or branches of
government dates back to its colonial history and break from British rule. 1
Colonial state governments experimented with a variety of judicial selection
systems, including popular elections and appointment systems, to assuage the
public's distrust of the legislature.12 While the Framers were cautious not to pass
* * *
13
*
judgment on individual states' governing structures,
their writings on
democratic governance stressed the importance of separation of powers and an
impartial, independent judiciary. 14 Moreover, throughout America's history, the
judiciary and the state judiciary in particular has been a constant source of
contention and focus of reformers nationwide. Today, these discussions persist
with enhanced vigor and statistical support in light of the increasingly polarized
disposition of American society and highly contested nature of judicial
elections. 16 In many ways, the continual whispers of dissatisfaction with state
judicial systems, as well as the constant calls for reforming these systems
throughout the various generations of American society, demonstrate that this
area is an interminable frontier in America's experiment in governing.
Part II of this Note briefly explains the importance of judicial independence
and its development through trial and happenstance in America-describing how
judicial elections began and evolved into the most pervasive method of judicial
selection in state governments, as well as the accountability mechanisms for the
federal judiciary. Part III describes the three main types of state judicial

10. See Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciariesand the Rule of
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 705 (1995) ("One might well describe constitutionalism as the
mechanism by which the democratic majority keeps itself faithful to certain important decisions it
makes.").
11. Id. at 714 (citing THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776)).
12. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison) (discussing the manner in
which states allocated powers among the branches of government, including the judiciary); Croley,
supra note 10, at 714-15 ("[S]ome early state constitutions provided for the election of some of
their judges.").
13. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 342 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.
1974). This caution was largely due to the Framers' respect for federalism and their belief that state
governments should keep the federal government in check. See id.
14. Croley, supra note 10, at 720 ("Harris, agreeing in part with Stow, explained that in his
view 'an independent judiciary' is 'the very soul of a free Constitution without it the best system
of government in the world is but a dead letter."' (citing REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF

NEW YORK, 1846, at 645 (Albany, Office of the Evening Atlas 1846) (statement of Mr. Harris))).
15. See, e.g., Francis J. Menton, Jr., Book Review, 12 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC'Y
PRACTICE GROUP 130, 130 (June 2011) (noting that "the methods of selecting the judges of the
supreme courts have come increasingly into focus").
16. See, e.g., id. at 130-31 (reviewing a book about judicial elections that "focused on
quantitative analysis of a limited number of questions that are subject to quantitative answers").
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selection systems in detail prior to outlining South Carolina's system, a fourth
method of judicial selection. Specifically, this Note highlights direct popular
elections, the Missouri Plan, and the appointment system. Part IV explores the
effects of the 1996 reform, along with the problems the reform sought to
alleviate but failed to remedy.
Finally, Part V sets forth the proposed
recommendations for a new system or, alternatively, a series of minor reforms to
the current system until South Carolina is ready to adopt the new system.
II.

BACKGROUND

This Part sets forth the evolution of the independent federal judicial
system a framework South Carolina should use in reforming its judicial
selection system. Part II also describes the environment that created the
transition, evolution, and divergence of state judiciaries to a variety of selection
methods as the foundation for the discussion of the various methods in Part III.
A.

The Development ofJudicialIndependence

Despite the Framers' clear vision for an independent judicial branch, the
independence of the federal judicial branch evolved slowly over time, through a
muddled process, as the different branches of government struggled to find their
role and spheres of influence in the new constitutional republic.1 The first
major development toward judicial independence occurred when, after the House
of Representatives voted to impeach a sitting Supreme Court Justice as a
political move, the Senate acquitted the Justice and thereby set the political
precedent that "a judge's judicial acts may not serve as a basis for
impeachment."
The second development came soon after the Civil War, when
the Supreme Court held that, under Article III of the Constitution, Congress has
the power to alter the Court's appellate jurisdiction without any judicial inquiry
into the congressional motivation. 19 While this second event allowed Congress

17. See Hon. William H. Rehnquist, JudicialIndependence, 38 U. RICH. L. REv. 579, 579,
582 (2004).
18. Id. at 584, 589. The first major event in this saga occurred when President John Adams
appointed the "Midnight Judges," which led to the impeachment trial against Supreme Court Justice
Samuel Chase. Id. at 583-84. George Washington originally appointed Justice Chase in 1796. Id.
at 584. The impeachment trial against Justice Chase was largely a political move from
Jeffersonians, who were unhappy with the content of Chase's rulings from the bench and would
have stifled the judiciary's independence had Justice Chase been convicted. Id. at 584, 588-89,
595. Instead, by voting to acquit Justice Chase, the Senate established the precedent that a judge's
acts in the exercise ofjudicial duties should not be the basis for impeachment. Id. at 588-89.
19. Id. at 591 (citing Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868)). In Ex parte
McCardle, the Court was expected to strike down the Reconstruction Acts as unconstitutional;
however, while the Court was considering the case, Congress repealed the legislation providing the
Court with the relevant appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 590 91, 595. The Court determined that it
"could not inquire into the Congressional motive behind the legislation." Id. at 591 (citing
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to retain some control over the judiciary, the Supreme Court ultimately survived
as an independent institution with its own sphere of influence and retained most
of its authority.20 The third development occurred when public outcry and other
factors protected the integrity of the institution by forcing President Franklin D.
Roosevelt to abandon his attempt to enlarge the size of the Supreme Court.21
Thus, regardless of America's distrust of the judiciary, this important branch of
government authority and independence has always been protected from
encroachments by the other branches. 22
B.

The Movement Toward JudicialElections

As the three branches of government vied for power among one another
during the struggle for judicial independence in this new constitutional republic,
the American public also entered the equation and contested the appointment
system for federal judges.23 The appointment system was the prevalent system
at the time; this system allowed the Executive Branch to appoint judges upon the
advice and consent of the Senate.24 The first major public outcry against this
system occurred in the 1820s and focused on claims of abuses in the
appointment of judges.25 Instead of resolving this abuse problem, the public's
switch in focus and prioritization of accountability over impartiality led to

McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 514). Therefore, the Court dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction instead of striking down the legislation. Id. at 590 91, 595.
20. See id. at 591 (describing the outcome of the McCardle case as the "best conceivable one
under the circumstances").
21. See id. at 591-95 (describing Roosevelt's proposal and its ultimate resolution).
Additionally, "the switch in time that saved nine" reinforced the integrity of the institution when the
Court upheld two pieces of New Deal legislation, rather than striking them down. Id. at 593-94
(citing FRED R. SHAPIRO, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 393

(1993)). An enlargement of the Court would have fundamentally changed its ideological balance,
allowing Roosevelt to pass his legislation without the Court's challenge. Id. at 593. The
enlargement also could have led to a severe loss in judicial independence by enabling every
subsequent President to alter the number of Justices on the Court for ideological purposes. See id.
at 592 93 (discussing Roosevelt's plan to allow the President to add additional members to the
Supreme Court).
22. See id. at 595.
23. See Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial
Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 273, 299 (2002)
(discussing public involvement through Senate confirmation and retention elections).
24. Id. at 300.
25. Martin Scott Driggers, Jr., South Carolina'sExperiment: Legislative Control ofJudicial
Merit Selection, 49 S.C. L. REv. 1217, 1220 (1998) (citing Maura A. Schoshinski, Note, Towards
an Independent, Fairand Competent Judiciary: An Argument for Improving JudicialElections, 7
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 839, 846 (1994)). Notably, some states used popular elections for their
judiciary at the time of the Constitutional Convention and, therefore, did not experience this
transition to the same degree as discussed above. See Croley, supra note 10, at 714-15. Instead,
Jacksonian Democrats used these states as examples to persuade other states to adopt election
models for their ownjudiciaries. See id. at 716-17.
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abuses of a different nature.26 Subsequently, in the mid-nineteenth century,
Jacksonian Democrats seized on this climate of unrest and convinced state
legislatures to adopt models of popular elections for udges under the same
partisan model as the executive and legislative branches. In the early twentieth
century, reformers called for a system that would incentivize higher quality
judges to join the system which led to today's structure-in which most states
use either a nonpartisan election model or an appointment system with retention
elections. 28
Interestingly, throughout these reforms, proponents of an election model
perpetuated their agenda through rhetoric filled with democratic principles, but
largely avoided any discussion of the potential drawbacks of a switch to an
election system.29 One major drawback of the election system is that judges can
become a tool of majoritarian politics instead of upholding the rule of law,
becoming beholden to those who elect them rather than interpreting the law.30
Additionally, the judicial branch is intended to serve as a guardian of minority
groups in critical moments-such as the historical moment surrounding the
Brown v. Board of Education31 decision when popular politics fails to protect
marginalized groups. 32 This function of the judiciary is commonly referred to as
the countermajoritariannature of the courts, and one of the reasons the federal
model of judicial selection is different than the other branches of government is
to ensure the judiciary's independence and impartiality. 33
C. JudicialAccountability
Perhaps anticipating the public outcry for an accountable judiciary, the
Framers created important structural accountability mechanisms that can be used
to override the decisions of the judiciary, while also insulating it from
majoritarian politics. 34 Constitutional amendments can trump judicial decisions,

26. Driggers, supra note 25, at 1220.
27. Menton, supra note 15, at 130.
28. See id.
29. Croley, supra note 10, at 722-23.
30. See id. at 720. Indeed, history showed the true danger of the election system when, "[b]y
the early twentieth century, elective judiciaries were increasingly viewed as plagued by
incompetence and corruption a view that in 1913 led Herbert Harley, Albert Kales, Roscoe Pound,
John Wigmore, and others to establish the American Judicature Society ("AJS") in the pursuit of
judicial reform." Id. at 723.
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. Id. at 495; Croley, supranote 10, at 722 & n. 103.
33. See Croley, supra note 10, at 693, 722 n.103 (citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (Yale 2d ed. 1986))
("Perhaps the issue was not so important for the simple reason that state courts were not very
involved in protecting rights ....
On the other hand, some supporters of elective judiciaries
implicitly acknowledged this role for state courts when they questioned whether the institution
would be able to protect minority rights in the face of electoral pressures.").
34. See id. at 708, 709.
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and a majority of Congress may change the jurisdiction of the courts. 35 Indeed, a
majority of Congress can change judicial decisions by simply changing the law
with appropriate legislation. 36 Additionally, judicial decisions require "sufficient
support" of a majority willing to comply with these decisions for purposes of
effectiveness and ensured execution.37 Generally, a federal judge is appointed
based on that person's position on constitutional and legal issues of the time. 38
Today, another important tool of accountability for the judiciary exists through
the media's open access to courts, which-through increased transparency
could provide grounds for an impeachment trial.39
Similarly, the framers of the South Carolina constitution built in structural
accountability mechanisms for the state's judiciary.40 In South Carolina, the
General Assembly can propose constitutional amendments to voters or pass
legislation to change the jurisdiction of the courts to counteract any unpopular
judicial decision.41 Moreover, as South Carolina's lawmaking body, the General
Assembly can change the law with appropriate legislation whenever necessary.42
The South Carolina judiciary also relies on the General Assembly and Governor
for approval of its operating budget, which inherently passes some control to the
other branches. 43 While the budgetary process follows the federal model, the
process still decreases the independence of the judiciary in South Carolina
because, contrary to the federal model, the General Assembly hand selects
members of the judicial branch. Thus, the General Assembly has power over the
personnel and the purse strings of the judicial branch in South Carolina. The
media, however, is relatively active in South Carolina and appears willing to
expose various weak points in the political and judicial systems, which could
provide the bases for impeachment trials.44

35. Id. at 709.
36. See id.
37. See id. "[T]he judiciary, from the nature of its fimctions, will always be the least
dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or
injure them." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton).
38. Croley, supranote 10, at 709.
39. See generally Geoffrey Robertson QC, The Media and Judicial Corruption, in
TRANSPARENCY INT'L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, at 108, 109 (2007) (discussing media
training as a possible solution to decrease judicial corruption).
40. See generally Ritchie, supra note 8, at 27 ("Since 1776, these judges have been elected
by the General Assembly.").
41. See generally S.C. CONST. art. V, § 5 (setting out the jurisdiction of the supreme court);
id. art. XVI, § 1 (explaining the process by which the Constitution may be amended).
42. See id. art. III, § 1 ("The legislative power of this State shall be vested in two distinct
branches, the one to be styled the 'Senate' and the other the 'House of Representatives,' and both
together the 'General Assembly of the State of South Carolina."').
43. See, e.g., Rick Brundrett, Chief Justice Proposes Big Budget Hike, Faces Screening
Hearing, THE NERVE (Nov. 4, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://thenerve.org/news/2013/11/04/Judicialbudget/ (explaining how Governor Nikki Haley would review Chief Justice Toal's proposed
judiciary budget before it was ultimately presented to the General Assembly).
44. See, e.g., Rick Brundrett, Judicial Income DisclosureLargely Hiddenfrom Public, THE
NERVE (Jan. 22, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://thenerve.org/news/2014/01/22/Judicial-Income/ (pointing
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III. METHODS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION
A.

PopularElections

Despite an American Bar Association (ABA) report calling for the end of all
forms of contested judicial elections, 45 popular election is the most widely used
system throughout the nation. 46 Today, thirty-three states use some form of
direct vote-either partisan or nonpartisan.47 Unfortunately, hotly contested
elections are increasingly becoming the trend, and even judicial elections are
becoming incredibly expensive-particularly with the growing involvement of
lawyers and powerful interest groups. 48 The volatile nature of these elections
creates an additional layer of concern, but uncontested elections would similarly
threaten the independence of the judiciary.49 A major concern is the effect of the
campaign contributions of lawyers and private citizens that later appear before
those same judges.o
B.

The Appointment System

Under the federal model, the President or, from an institutional standpoint,
the Executive Branch is entrusted with the appointment power of judges, who
are then subject to legislative confirmation with the advice and consent of the

out that information about judges' income is not readily available to the public); Jamie Self, Report:
S.C. Gets 'F' for Disclosure - Judiciary, THE STATE, Dec. 4, 2013, at 11, available at http://
www.thestate.com/2013/12/04/3137683/report-gives-sc-an-f-for-disclosure.html (noting that South
Carolina is one of ten states that does not ask its judges for information about investments, financial
liabilities, or the employment of their spouses); see generally S.C. CONST. art. XV, § 2 ("All
impeachments shall be tried by the Senate ....
45. Menton, supra note 15, at 130.
46. Kevin Eberle, Judicial Selection in South Carolina: Who Gets to Judge?, S.C. LAW.,
May June 2002, at 20, 20 (citing Judith L. Maute, Selecting Justice in State Courts: The Ballot Box
or the Backroom?, 41 S. TEx. L. REv. 1197, 1201-02 (2000)).
47. Id. (citing Maute, supra note 46, at 1201-02).
48. Menton, supra note 15, at 130 31; see, e.g., Andrew Cohen, An Elected Judge Speaks
Out Against Judicial Elections, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 3, 2013, 2:04 PM), http://www.
theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/09/an-elected-judge-speaks-out-against-judicial-elections/27
9263/ (discussing judges who have spoken out against judicial elections); Ian Millhiser, Justice
Ginsburg: Elections Are 'A Dreadful Way to Choose People for Judicial Office,' THINK PROGRESS
(July 30, 2013, 11:37 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/07/30/2380321/justice-ginsburgelections-are-a-dreadful-way-to-choose-people-for-judicial-office/ (discussing Justice Ginsburg's
opinion that "electing judges is a 'dreadful' idea"); Joanna Shepherd, Justice at Risk: An Empirical
Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, AM. CONST. SOC'Y FOR LAW &
POLICY, June 2013, at 1, 9 ("The increasing competitiveness and expense of judicial elections offers
interest groups the opportunity to influence judicial outcomes.").
49. See Cohen, supra note 48 (highlighting that "judicial elections impair the fair
administration of justice by fostering impermissible appearances of impartiality," which would be
problematic regardless of whether the election was contested).
50. Menton, supra note 15, at 130-31.
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51

Senate.
The Constitution safeguards the impartiality of federal judges by
barring the reduction of their salaries throughout their tenure on the bench, as
well as insulating these judges from the undue political pressures associated with
52
campaigning.
Unfortunately, only four states presently retain lifetime tenure:
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island.53 Indeed,
lifetime tenure may be the most critical component of the federal model's
protection of judges' impartiality.54 The federal model was the most prevalent
method of selection used by states during the founding of America, but it lost
popularity with the rise of the Jacksonian Democrats. 5 Today, only a handful of
states use a variation of the federal model, including California, New Jersey, and
Maine.56
C. The Missouri Plan Hybrid
In contrast, the Missouri Plan5 -or the "merit selection" model-is a hybrid
system that preserves elections, but seeks to alleviate some of the negative
effects of popular judicial elections.58 This plan uses a nonpartisan state
nominating commission for judges who are then appointed by either the
legislature or the Governor.59 Then, judges face uncontested retention elections
by the public, which are similar to votes of no confidence.60 If a judge loses,
then the process starts over with a new nomination and subsequent
appointment. 6 1 Today, fourteen states use the Missouri Plan as the method of
selection for their state judges. 62

51. See COAL. FOR JUSTICE, AM. BAR ASS'N, JUDICIAL SELECTION: THE PROCESS OF
CHOOSING JUDGES 5 (2008); Behrens & Silverman, supra note 23, at 300.

52. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Behrens & Silverman, supra note 23, at 300 (citing U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1).
53. Behrens & Silverman, supra note 23, at 301.
54. See id. at 300 n. 143 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 495 (Alexander Hamilton)).
55. COAL. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 4.
56. Id. at 5-6; Behrens & Silverman, supra note 23, at 300.
57. Croley, supra note 10, 724. The plan, originally developed by Albert Kales-a faculty
member of Northwestern Law School was named after the first state to adopt it. Id.
58. See id.
59. See id.; Elberle,supra note 46, at 22; Menton, supra note 15, at 130.
60. Croley, supra note 10, at 724; Eberle, supra note 46, at 22; Menton, supra note 15 at 130.
61. Croley, supra note 10, at 724.
62. Eberle, supra note 46, at 22. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Wyoming use the Missouri
Plan. Methods of JudicialSelection, AM. JUDICATURE SOCIETY, http://www.judicialselection.com/
judicial selection/methods/selection ofjudges.cfm?state= (last visited Mar. 24, 2014).
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D. South Carolina'sHybrid System
Only two states, South Carolina and Virginia, use a hybrid system of merit
selection coupled with legislative elections. 63 Although this system remains the
prevalent system known and used in South Carolina, in reality, South Carolina
uses three of the four judicial models popular election, appointment, and this
hybrid system at varying levels of its judiciary. 64 The South Carolina
constitution establishes a supreme court, court of appeals, and circuit court and
sets forth a series of requirements individuals must meet to be eligible for a
position on any of these courts.65 In particular, at the time of election, an
individual must be (1) a citizen of the United States, (2) a citizen of South
Carolina for at least five years prior to election, (3) at least thirty-two years old,
and (4) a licensed attorney for at least eight years.66 Additionally, the Judicial
67
Merit Selection Commission (JMSC) must nominate the individual.
Finally,
while the South Carolina constitution imposes a mandatory retirement age of
seventy-two for trial and appellate court judges, it does not limit the number of
terms served.6 8
The South Carolina General Assembly elects justices of the supreme court to
staggered ten-year terms-to ensure that a judicial election occurs every two

63. Ritchie, supra note 8, at 28; see also Eberle, supra note 46, at 20 (stating that
Connecticut, Virginia, and South Carolina are the only states that use legislative selection to select
judges (citing Daniel R. Deja, How Judges are Selected: A Survey of the Judicial Selection Process
in the United States, 75 MICH. B.J. 904, 904-05 (1996))). Deja's article states that Connecticut uses
legislative selection as well. Deja, supra, at 904, 905. Today, however, Connecticut uses a
commission that makes recommendations to the Governor. Methods of Judicial Selection:
Connecticut, Am. JUDICATURE Soc'Y, http://www.judicialselection.com/judicial-selection/methods
/selection ofjudges.cfm?state=CT (last visited Mar. 24, 2014). The Governor then chooses
nominees from these recommendations, and the legislature appoints nominees in a manner
prescribed by law. Id.; CONN. CONST. art. V, § 2.
64. See generally Karen L. Huelson, A Snapshot of the South Carolina Court System, S.C.
LAW., Nov. 2012, at 34 (describing the different levels of the court system in South Carolina). The
South Carolina General Assembly elects supreme court justices for "staggered, 10-year terms." Id.
at 34 (citing S.C. CONST. art. V, § 3; S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-3-10 (2009)). The General Assembly
elects court of appeals judges for six-year terms. Id. at 37 (citing S.C. CONST. art. V, § 8; S.C.
CODE ANN. § 14-8-20(a) (Supp. 2013)). The Governor appoints masters-in-equity, with the advice
and consent of the General Assembly, for six-year terms. Id. at 39 (citing S.C. CONST. art. V, § 26;
S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-11-20 (Supp. 2013)). Probate judges, however, are elected to a four-year
term by "popular vote of the qualified electors in their respective counties." Id. at 41 (citing S.C.
CODE ANN. § 62-1-309 (2009)). "The governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate,"
appoints magistrate judges. Id. at 42 (citing S.C. CONST. art. V, § 26).
65. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 1; see generally id. § 27 (establishing the Judicial Merit Selection
Commission to oversee the "qualifications and fitness of candidates for all judicial positions" on the
Supreme Court and other courts filled by election in the General Assembly); Huelson, supra note
64, at 34 (explaining that individuals running for judgeships filled by election of the General
Assembly must be nominated by the Judicial Merit Selection Commission).
66. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 15; Huelson, supra note 64, at 34.
67. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 27; Huelson, supra note 64, at 34.
68. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 9-8-40, -60 (1986 & Supp. 2013); Huelson, supra note 64, at 34.
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years whereas the court of appeals and circuit court judges' terms last six
years.6 9 Proponents laud this system for partially freeing its judges from public
concern, while producing a judiciary that is in line with public sentiment via
elections by the General Assembly.70 This argument in favor of the system,
however, relies on the critical assumption that the General Assembly is also in
sync with popular sentiment. Moreover, critics point out that judges are only
freed until the next legislative election.72
In 1996, South Carolina notably undertook a major reform of its judicial
selection model, but the General Assembly ultimately retained its control over
the election of judges. The 1996 reform came after a highly publicized election
in 1995 that showed just how partisan and personal elections had become.
During this 1995 election, the current chief justice, Jean Toal, faced opposition
for her seat on the bench. Chief Justice Toal was personally attacked for being
"out of touch with the taxpayer" and labeled a liberal.76 Ultimately, Chief

69. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 3 ("The members of the Supreme Court shall be elected by a joint
public vote of the General Assembly for a term of ten years, and shall continue in office until their
successors shall be elected and qualified, and shall be classified so that the term of one of them shall
expire every two years."); id. art. V, § 8 ("The members of the Court of Appeals shall be elected by
a joint public vote of the General Assembly for a term of six years and shall continue in office until
their successors shall be elected and qualify. In any contested election, the vote of each member of
the General Assembly present and voting shall be recorded. Provided, that for the first election of
members of the Court of Appeals, the General Assembly shall by law provide for staggered
terms."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-3-10 (1976) ("The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Justice
and four associate justices, who shall be elected by a joint viva voce vote of the General Assembly
for a term of ten years and shall continue in office until their successors are elected and qualified.
They shall be so classified that one of them shall go out of office every two years. The successors
of the Chief Justice and associate justices shall each be elected at the session of the General
Assembly next preceding the expiration of their respective terms."); id. § 14-8-20(a) (Supp. 2013)
("The members of the Court shall be elected by joint public vote of the General Assembly for a term
of six years and until their successors are elected and qualify; provided, however, that of those
judges initially elected, the Chief Judge (Seat 5) and the judge elected to Seat 6 shall be elected for
terms of six years each, the judges elected to Seats 3 and 4 shall be elected for terms of four years
each, and the judges elected to Seats 1 and 2 shall be elected for terms of two years each.").
70. Eberle, supra note 46, at 22.
71. See id.
72. See id.

73. Id.
74. See Driggers,supra note 25, at 1217-18. Interest groups even participated by holding
press conferences on their opinion of the proper candidate and outcome of the election. Id. at 1217
(citing Cindi Ross Scoppe & Lisa Greene, Voting Opensfor Toal, Ervin: Supreme Court Seat, THE
STATE, Feb. 6, 1996, at Bl).
75. See id. at 1217. See generally Scoppe & Greene, supra note 73 (discussing the election
and noting that Jean Toal was the incumbent supreme court justice in the election).
76. Driggers, supra note 25, at 1217 & n.2 (citing Cindi Ross Scoppe & Lisa Greene, Politics
Set Stage for Toal Hearing, THE STATE, Jan. 17, 1996, at Al).

See generally Scoppe & Greene,

supra note 73, at B 1 (noting that Jean Toal was the incumbent supreme court justice in the election).
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Justice Toal won her reelection and her opponent withdrew, but the stage was set
for the 1996 reform.
Under the pre-1996 system, a committee oversaw the judicial selection
process and issued findings on qualifications, but this committee had no defined
qualification criteria and a finding of unqualifieddid not bar an individual from
being considered or elected.7' Additionally, nothing prevented legislators from
running for judicial office during their service in the General Assembly, and
nothing restricted the number of candidates that could run for a judicial
election. In sum, these factors created a public sentiment that the judiciary was
simply a retirement plan for legislators, thus perpetuating the good-old-boy
network.so
The most significant reform in 1996 was the establishment of the JMSC.81
The JMSC was a revolutionary change to the judicial selection process because it
introduced candidate screening-a process based on objective criteria.82 The
JMSC uses the following criteria: "(1) constitutional qualifications; (2) ethical
fitness; (3) professional and academic ability; (4) character; (5) reputation;
(6) physical health; (7) mental stability; (8) experience; and (9) judicial
temperament." 83 Next, the reforms limited the number of individuals the
General Assembly could consider for election to the three candidates found
qualified and nominated by the JMSC, which has some discretion to determine
the three individuals best qualified for the available position. 84
More
importantly, the reforms barred members of the General Assembly from being
elected to a judicial position for one year after either serving in the General

77. See Driggers, supra note 25, at 1218; see generally Scoppe & Greene, supra note 73
(noting that Jean Toal was the incumbent supreme court justice in the election).
78. Driggers, supra note 25, at 1229 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-19-10 to -60 (1986),
amended by S.C. CODE ANN. §§2-19-10 to -120 (Supp. 1997)).
79. Id. at 1229-30.
80. Ritchie, supra note 8, at 27 ("In fact, in the early to mid-90s, all five Supreme Court
Justices and more than half of the circuit court judges had served in the General Assembly prior to
being elected to the bench. Calls for reform escalated when, in 1995, two former legislators who
were elected to judgeships were found 'not qualified' by the South Carolina Bar.").
8 1. See id.
82. See Eberle, supra note 46, at 22 ("The most notable change to the [judicial selection]
process was the creation of the Judicial Merit Selection Commission."); see, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 2-19-10, -35 (2005) (setting out the criteria for the JMSC to use when screening judicial
candidates); Ritchie, supra note 8, at 28 (explaining how the statutes empower the JMSC with an
objective criteria to screen judicial candidates).
83. § 2-19-35(A); Ritchie, supra note 8, at 28; see generally S.C. CONST. art. V, § 27
(describing the general function of the JMSC).
84. § 2-19-80(A)-(B) ("[The commission] shall review the qualifications of all applicants for
a judicial office and select therefrom and submit to the General Assembly the names and
qualifications of the three candidates whom it considers best qualifiedfor the judicial office under
consideration.... The nominations of the commission for any judgeship are binding on the
General Assembly, and it shall not elect a person not nominated by the commission.") (emphasis
added); Ritchie, supra note 8, at 28.
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Assembly or failing to file for reelection. 5 Additionally, the reform requires that
the JMSC provide a written report on its findings to each member of the General
Assembly to allow lawmakers the opportunity to make informed decisions with
regard to the elections. 86 These JMSC reports are considered final after fortyeight hours, at which time the candidates may begin campaigning for pledges
from members of the General Assembly.8
In cases of pledge rule violations,88 the JMSC is empowered to consider the
issue when deliberating a candidate's qualifications; report an individual's
violation to the House or Senate Ethics Committee; report a nonlegislative
individual's violation to the South Carolina State Ethics Commission; and, upon
conviction of a misdemeanor, fine an individual no more than one thousand
dollars or order imprisonment for up to ninety days. 89 The JMSC is also
required to consider race, gender, national origin, and other demographic factors
when making its nominations. 90
Additionally, the 1996 reform inserted the public into the process by
allowing the chairman of the JMSC, when advised by the commission, to select
individuals to serve on Citizens Committees on Judicial Qualification. 91 These
citizens provide their opinions on the candidates to the JMSC in the form
requested and in accordance with the rules adopted by the commission.92 The
JMSC relies heavily on these committees, five of which were established in
different geographic locations throughout the state. 93 Finally, the JMSC is

85. § 2-19-70(A) ("No member of the General Assembly may be elected to a judicial office
while he is serving in the General Assembly nor shall that person be elected to a judicial office for a
period of one year after he either: (1) ceases to be a member of the General Assembly; or (2) fails to
file for election to the General Assembly in accordance with Section 7-11-15."); Ritchie, supra note
8, at 28.
86. § 2-19-80(D) ("The commission shall accompany its nominations to the General
Assembly with reports or recommendations as to the qualifications of particular candidates.");
Ritchie, supra note 8, at 28, 29.
87. Ritchie, supra note 8, at 29.
88. § 2-19-70(C); Ritchie, supra note 8, at 29 (describing what constitutes a pledge and
explaining the prohibition on accepting pledges).
89. § 2-19-70(E); Ritchie, supra note 8, at 29. No cases, however, cite to this subsection of
the statute.
90. § 2-19-35(B); Ritchie, supra note 8, at 28 (stating that the aim of this requirement is "to
ensure nondiscrimination to the greatest extent possible as to all segments of the population of the
State" (quoting § 2-19-35(B))).
91. § 2-19-120(A) ("The Chairman of the Judicial Merit Selection Commission, upon the
advice of the commission, shall select members to serve on Citizens Committees on Judicial
Qualifications for each geographic district set by the commission. These committees shall, under
the rules adopted by the commission, advise the commission concerning judicial candidates.");
Eberle, supra note 46, at 24 (citing § 2-19-120); Citizens Committees on Judicial Qualifications:
Mission Statement, S.C. LEGISLATURE, http://www.scstatehouse.gov/judicialmeritpage/CITIZENS

COMMITTEESONJUDICIALQUALIFICATIONS041613.pdf (last updated Apr. 17, 2013).
92. § 2-19-120(A); Eberle, supra note 46, at 24; Citizens Committee Mission Statement,
supra note 91.
93. See Citizens Committee Information, supra note 91.
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encouraged to reach out to members of the South Carolina Bar for assessments
of candidates for judicial election. 94
IV. EFFECTS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE 1996 REFORM
The 1996 reform has proved largely unsuccessful because of its failure to
adequately address the four major themes underlying this change in the law:
(1) the impact of prior legislative experience, (2) the impact of a candidate's
race, (3) the impact of a candidate's gender, and (4) the number of candidates
running for judicial office. 95 A survey conducted in the spring of 2005 by the
state Senate Judiciary Committee showed that the reform led to some progress in
the caliber and experience of judicial candidates. 96 The same survey, however,
showed that even after the creation of the JMSC, the diversity of judicial
candidates on the bench only increased slightly.97 Prior South Carolina Bar
President Betsy Gray acknowledged the shortcomings of the 1996 reform by
stating that, while the reform made the system slightly better, the changes did not
make the system perfect. 98 Arthur Vanderbilt, past President of the ABA,
acknowledged that "[j]udicial reform is no sport for the short-winded." 99 If the
results of the 1996 reform are any indication, Vanderbilt was correct. In the
aftermath of the 1996 reform, South Carolina's judicial branch remains plagued
by various issues, including lack of diversity, lack of impartiality and fair
administration of justice, lack of public confidence, and lack of separation of
powers among the branches of government. 100
A.

Diversity

Even after the reform, the lack of diversity continues to be a major issue for
the composition of the bench in South Carolina. 10 1 Not only does the intentional
and systemic exclusion of groups based on race or gender undermine the
perceived legitimacy of legal institutions, it also undermines the political system

94. § 2-19-25 ("The Judicial Merit Selection Commission is authorized to investigate and
obtain information relative to any candidate."); Ritchie, supra note 8, at 29.
95. See generally Ritchie, supra note 8, at 30 (explaining the four issues the reform was
attempting to address and explaining that, while there have been some positive effects, "there is still
a long way to go").
96.

See id.

97. See id. at 29-30 (noting that this fact is particularly alarming considering the wide
diversity of people that call South Carolina home).
98. See Eberle, supra note 46, at 25.
99.

Id. (citing CHARLES HENNING, THE WIT & WISDOM OF POLITICS 107 (1989)) (internal

quotation marks omitted).
100. See generally infra Part IV (discussing each of these issues within the South Carolina
judiciary).
101. See generally Ritchie, supra note 8, at 30 31 (noting that women and African-Americans

made little progress after judicial selection reform).
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as a whole.102 Ironically, proponents of judicial elections regularly claim that
one major benefit of elective judicial systems is that they open access to
historically marginalized groups, enabling members of these groups to secure
judicial offices. 3 However, studies of election-based states versus nonelectionbased states have invalidated this claim.104 In fact, with regard to state high
courts or intermediate appellate courts, one study found that only 29% of female
justices were elected to the bench. o0 This study also found that, in the same
levels of state judiciaries, only 27% of black justices were elected to the
bench. 106 Accordingly, "the argument for open access to the judiciary if
anything argues against, certainly not in favor of, elective judiciaries, which
explains some elective states' troubles under the Voting Rights Act."o10
The recent experience in South Carolina parallels this 1993 study and
indicates that race continues to impact a candidate's likelihood for success. os
From 1997 to 2004, 26.96% of Caucasian, or other, candidates were elected to
the bench in South Carolina. 109 Conversely, only 10.76% of African-American
candidates were successful. 110 In fact, as of 2010, minorities filled only 8 of the
118 judicial positions in South Carolina."' These statistics reflect the likelihood
of a candidate's success based on race, 112 which may be attributable to the
JMSC recommendation and nomination process.
In light of the 1996 reform, women have fared moderately better in elections
than other underrepresented groups, but still fall below their male
counterparts.113 In South Carolina, women accounted for 52% of the state

102. Croley, supranote 10, at 784.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 784-85. The appendices to Croley's article describe a series of empirical tests that
support these statements. See id. at 784-85 n.252. In particular, Table 1 provides data on state
appellate courts both intermediate appellate and high courts-counting retention election states as
elective states. See id. at 791. Table 2 provides similar data, except it counts retention election
states as nonelective states. Id. Finally, Table 3 provides the "Chi-Square Test of Association"
between elective and nonelective judicial systems, as well as data on the representation of women
on those appellate courts, counting retention election states as elective states. Id. at 792.
105. See id. at 786 (noting that, out of the 166 women judges and justices, 48 won elections to
get to the bench).
106. See id. (noting that 17 out of the 62 sitting black judges and justices were elected to the
bench). It is important to note, however, that this statistic comes from a 1993 survey. See id. at 791
n.263 (noting that the data for the tables was prepared by the American Judicature Society in 1993).
107. Id. at 786.
108. See generally Ritchie, supra note 8, at 29-30 ("[D]iversity on the bench has not
progressed as well as expected.").
109. See id. at 31 (quoting remarks made by state Senator Glenn McConnell on June 2, 2005).
110. Id. (quoting remarks made by state Senator Glenn McConnell on June 2, 2005).
111. SAFEGUARDING U.S. DEMOCRACY: QUEST FOR A MORE DIVERSE JUDICIARY, LEAGUE

OF WOMEN VOTERS, THE STATE OF DIVERSITY IN THE SOUTH CAROLINA JUDICIARY (2010),
available at http://www.lwvsc.org/files/brochure.pdf (noting this is equivalent to seven percent).
112. See generally id. (describing the different systems for judicial elections and how those
systems can affect diversity).
113. See Ritchie, supra note 8, at 30 (quoting remarks made by Senator Glenn McConnell on
June 2, 2005).
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population and 35% of the state's lawyers as of 2010.114 Nevertheless, women
filled only 22% of state judgeships.1 1 5 Although six states with merit selection
systems now require diversity among their commissioners to ensure the
commissioners' nominations are diverse, South Carolina has no such
provision.116 Moreover, ten states with merit selection systems have formal
provisions that prohibit discrimination in the nominatin process.1 1 Once again,
the South Carolina Code contains no similar provisions.
B. Lack ofImpartiality and FairAdministration ofJustice
The lack of both impartiality and the fair administration of justice continue
to burden the judicial system.
Nationally, empirical data today shows that a
direct and significant statistical relationship exists between business
contributions to state supreme court justices and the way those justices vote in
cases involving business disputes.12 0 In fact, the data shows that, when justices
receive at least half of their campaign donations from business groups, one can
generally expect them to vote in favor of business interests about two-thirds of
the time. 121 This data shows that judges may be swayed by campaign
contributions.122 The reality of these studies is that campaign contributions are
affecting judges and jeopardizing fair and impartial justice, irrespective of the
form of such influence.123 This impact must be curtailed, especially given that
spending on judicial races is increasing exponentially.124

114. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 111.

115. Id.
116. Id. ("A study of merit selection systems found that a more diverse nominating
commission is more likely to recommend persons of color and women.").
117. Id.
118. Id.; cf S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-19-35(B) (2005) ("In making nominations, race, gender,
national origin, and other demographic factors should be considered by the commission to ensure
nondiscrimination to the greatest extent possible as to all segments of the population of the state.")
(emphasis added).
119. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 48, at 1 (explaining how statistics prove that judicial
elections lead to impartiality and cause judges to lose their neutrality).
120. See id. (quoting Shepherd, supranote 48, at 1).
121. Id. (quoting Shepherd, supra note 48, at 1).
122. See generally id. (discussing the study which "confirm[s] a significant relationship
between business group contributions to state supreme court justices and the voting of those justices
in cases involving business matters" (quoting Shepherd, supra note 48, at 1)).
123. Shepherd, supra note 48, at 9 ("Whether the campaign contributions determine which
judges are on the bench or they influence how the judges on the bench decide cases-or both the
rising tide of campaign contributions from interest groups is placing fair and impartial justice at
risk.").
124. See Cohen, supra note 48 ("Between 2000-2009, campaign fundraising was three times
greater in states with partisan elections; candidates in these races raised $153.8 million across nine
states, compared to $50.9 million raised in the thirteen states with nonpartisan elections." (quoting
Shepherd, supra note 48, at 5)).
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Additionally, in South Carolina, some legislators are lawyers that either
currently practice or may return to private practice upon the conclusion of their
time in the General Assembly.125 Therefore, some legislators currently appear in
court before the very judges they helped elect,126 which raises serious concerns
about the fair administration of justice and impartiality of judges.127 On the
other hand, the 1996 reform's ban on the selection and recommendation of
sitting legislators for judicial positions for one year after serving in the General
Assembly was aimed at decreasing the appearance of impropriety. 12 This ban,
however, has done little to restore public confidence in South Carolina's judicial
selection process.129
These issues are such notable concerns that Supreme Court Justices have
cautioned against judicial election models.130 Sandra Day O'Connor, who was
an elected judge prior to her appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court,131 stated
that judicial elections lead to a decline in peoples' perceptions of judicial
credibility and impartiality.132 In a July 2013 interview, Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg stated:
Judges are to be impartial. They are to judge without fear or favor.
They are not to be beholden to any group. But it may be a little hard, if
a group of lawyers has funded your campaign, for you to be impartial, or
even if you are, to project the appearance of being impartial.1 33
All of these reasons led to her conclusion that electing judges is a "dreadful"
idea. 134 Although these sentiments are largely directed at "pure" popular
election systems, many perceive judicial elections by the South Carolina General
Assembly in the same manner.135

125. See generally Teresa Nesbitt Cosby, Picking the Supremes: The Impact of Money,
Politics, and Influence in JudicialElections, 4 FAULKNER L. REV. 73, 118 (2012) (citing Interview
with anonymous lawyer, Feb. 11, 2011); Interview with anonymous elected judge, Apr. 13, 2011))
(discussing the "growing concern over lawyer/legislator conflicts of interests").
126. See generally id. (describing how judges can give deference to the legislators who helped
get them elected).
127. See generally id. (discussing the impartiality concerns that lawyers have about the current
judicial selection process in South Carolina and Virginia).
128. See Driggers,supra note 25, at 1230.
129. See generally Brundrett, supra note 44 (discussing how judicial candidates with
legislative connections all recently won their elections).
130. See, e.g., Millhiser, supra note 48 (stating that Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg called
electing judges a "'dreadful' idea").
131. Craig Joyce, Afterword: Lazy B and the Nation's Court: Pragmatism in Service of
Principle, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1257, 1262 (2006) ("In 1974, she was elected a state court trial
judge.").
132. See Cohen, supra note 48.
133. Millhiser, supra note 48 (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
135. See generally Self, supra note 44, at 11 ("In Public Integrity's ratings, South Carolina
tied for 32nd among the 50 states with Texas, Georgia and Mississippi.").
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Further complicating the lack of impartiality and fair administration of
justice in South Carolina is the state supreme court's exclusive jurisdiction over
direct appeals in cases concerning "a final judgment from the circuit court
pertaining to elections and election procedures."l36 Additionally, if a case
concerns an issue of significant public interest, then the supreme court can move
to review the case on its own and bypass the court of appeals.137 Therefore, the
judicial branch elected by the General Assembly has final review and
jurisdiction over its own elections.138 This grant of jurisdiction creates a conflict
of interest, the appearance of dishonesty, and the opportunity for abuse of power
by the judiciary.
Ideally, a branch of government not directly affected by the
election, such as a state assembly in a system without judicial elections, would
be responsible for providing checks and balances to the election procedures of
the judiciary to ensure the integrity of the institution. 140
In the 2010 case of Segars-Andrews v. Judicial Merit Selection
Commission,141 Judge Segars-Andrews appealed a JMSC ruling to the South
Carolina Supreme Court. 2 The supreme court, however, denied her request
after the JMSC determined that, because of her failure to recuse herself from a
case, Judge Segars-Andrews failed to meet the "ethical fitness" criteria for
reelection to the bench.143 Prior to filing for reelection with the JMSC, Judge
Segars-Andrews' decision to remain in the case was supported by an ethics
expert, as well as reviews by the South Carolina Court of Appeals and the
Commission on Judicial Conduct.144 In this instance, the JMSC recognized that
a judge's ruling must be made "in a manner that promote[s] public confidence in
145
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Thus, the very concerns

136. Huelson, supra note 64, at 36 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-8-200(b) (Supp. 2013)).
137. Id. at 38 ("When a case is still pending in the Court of Appeals and involves an issue of
significant public interest, a legal principle of major importance, or in other appropriate instances,
the Supreme Court may in its discretion, on motion of any party to the case, on request by the Court
of Appeals or on its own motion certify the case for review by the Supreme Court." (citing § 14-82 10(b))).
138. See id. at 36, 38 (discussing the supreme court's jurisdiction over final judgments from
the court of appeals and discretionary appellate review for the cases invoking the public interest
(citing §§ 14-8-200(b), -210(b))).
139. See generally Cosby, supra note 125, at 118 (explaining how conflicts of interests can
arise when legislator lawyers appear before judges whom they helped get elected); Cohen, supra
note 48 (stating that judicial elections "foster[] impermissible appearances of impartiality");
Millhiser, supra note 48 (reporting Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's concern that judicial campaigns
can lead to impartiality).
140. See generally Rehnquist, supra note 17, at 579, 581 ("Judicial independence is one of the
touchstones of our constitutional system of government.").
141. 387 S.C. 109, 691 S.E.2d 453 (2010) (per curiam).
142. Id. at 114, 116, 691 S.E.2d at 456, 457; John P. Freeman, Appearance of Impropriety,
Recusal, and the Segars-Andrews Case, 62 S.C. L. REV. 485, 508 (2011) (citing Segars-Andrews,
387 S.C. at 116, 691 S.E.2d at 597).
143. Segars-Andrews, 387 S.C. at 115, 116, 691 S.E.2d at 456, 457.
144. Freeman, supranote 142, at 503.
145. Id. at 511 (quoting Cannon 2A, Rule 501, SCACR) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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created by the supreme court's final review over judicial elections arose as
recently as 2010.
Unfortunately, one proper ruling in the past does not
guarantee the propriety of the system in the future.
Another problem with the unfair administration of justice in South Carolina
is that the state requires a higher burden of proof than the U.S. Constitution with
regard to plaintiffs' recusal arguments. 147 In Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal
Co., 148 the U.S. Supreme Court held that "a due process violation can be
premised on evidence that falls short of 'proof of actual bias."' 1 49 Conversely,
the standard in South Carolina requires a plaintiff to prove actual prejudice.
The imposition of a higher burden of proof on plaintiffs in South Carolina
directly contradicts the Caperton Court's observation that "the codes of judicial
conduct provide more protection than due process requires."
C. Lack ofPublic Confidence
According to one scholar, "Almost 90 percent of voters and 80 percent of
judges believe that by means of campaign contributions, interest groups are
trying to use the courts to shape policy."l52 These national statistics are
alarming, particularly considering that "[t]he Code of Judicial Conduct defines a
good judge as one who avoids the appearance of partiality."l53 Ironically, the
interest groups that are perceived to benefit from judicial elections, including big
business and tort reform groups, are against popular election models.154 While
South Carolina does not use a popular election model, the concerns about

146. See generally id. (stating that Segars-Andrews, decided in 2010, demonstrated that not
only must judges decide cases correctly, they must also do so in a manner that appears impartial to
the public).
147. See id. at 511-12 (citing Caperton v. AT. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009)).
148. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
149. Freeman, supra note 142, at 491 (quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883).
150. Id. at 494 (citing Simpson v. Simpson, 377 S.C. 519, 525, 660 S.E.2d 274, 277 (Ct. App.
2008) (per curiam)).
151. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 890; see also Freeman, supra note 142, at 494 ("The Due Process
Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial disqualifications. Congress and the states, of
course, remain free to impose more rigorous standards for judicial disqualification than those we
find mandated here today." (quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. at 889-90)).
152. Shepherd, supra note 48, at 1 (citing GREENBURG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH INC.,
JUSTICE AT STAKE FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 9 (Oct. 30 - Nov. 7, 2001), http://www.justiceat
stake.org/media/cms/JASNationalSurveyResults_6F537F99272D4.pdf;
GREENBURG QUINLAN
ROSNER RESEARCH INC, JUSTICE AT STAKE FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 9 (Nov. 5, 2001 Jan. 2,
2002), http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/JASJudgesSurveyResultsEA8838C0504A5.pdf).
Additionally, "in a national survey of more than 2000 judges about a decade ago, nearly half of state
court judges-46 percent believe that campaign contributions have some or at least 'a little
influence' on their decisions." Cohen, supra note 48 (quoting a response he received from Adam
Skaggs, Alicia Bannon, and Matt Menendez of the Brennan Center for Justice).
153. Freeman, supra note 142, at 513.
154. See Cohen, supra note 48 (quoting an email from Texas Supreme Court Justice Don
Willett, an elected jurist).
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interest group influence remains real because any reform to the system can only
occur through the General Assembly, which maintains the largest outside interest
in retaining the current model.
Furthermore, the lack of demarcation and clear distinction between the roles
of the judicial branch and the legislative branch especially when members of
both branches are required to campaign for their positions undermines the
public's confidence : in the eyes of the public, judges appear more like
This issue is particularly
politicians than impartial interpreters of the law.
relevant in South Carolina, where prior legislative experience increases one's
chances for election to the judiciary.1 5 8 As previously discussed, the simple
appearance of impropriety which the impact and decline of public confidence
could indicate-may be enough to raise constitutional due process concerns.159
If, however, South Carolina can remedy its diversity problems, then the judiciary
may at least to some extent be able to restore public confidence in the
fairness and impartiality of the courts. 160
D. Lack ofSeparation ofPowers
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution prudently crafted a document that
created three distinct and separate branches of government with carefully
delineated powers.161 The underlying principle of separation of powers is of
fundamental importance to America's government and is best captured in the

155. See Cosby, supra note 125, at 118-19 (explaining how attorney legislators have a
"vested financial interest in maintaining the status quo" (quoting Elizabeth Harring, Judicial
Selection in Virginia: An Inherently Flawed Process, JEFFERSON POL'Y J., Mar. 17, 2009,
http://jeffersonpolicy/journal.com/?400)).
156. See Cohen, supra note 48 ("In seeking votes, in acting like politicians, judges invariably
lose what they ought to prize most: their perceived credibility as neutral arbiters of cases and
controversies.").
157. See id.
158. See Bradley C. Canon, The Impact of FormalSelection Processes on the Characteristics
of Judges Reconsidered, 6 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 579, 584 (1972) (stating that the practice of
legislators choosing judges from among themselves is frequent in South Carolina).
159. See Cohen, supra note 48; Freeman, supra note 142, at 491 (citing Caperton v. AT.
Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 877, 884, 886 (2009)).
160. See generally Ritchie, supra note 8, at 30 (explaining how diversity on the bench is still a
problem in South Carolina); Norman L. Greene, The Judicial Independence Through Fair
Appointments Act, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 13, 17 (2007) ("Diversity in the nominating process is
responsive to core American values and essential to building public confidence in the appointment
system.").
161. See Richard W. Miller, Simmons v. Greenville Hospital: An Unusually Stringent Rule
Against Retroactive Legislation, 56 S.C. L. REV. 707, 707 (2005) (citing Rebecca L. Brown,
SeparatedPowers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1539 (1991)) (highlighting the
importance of separation of powers).
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Founding Fathers' own writings.162 James Madison wrote that "where the whole
power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the
whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free
constitution are subverted."
Thus, each branch provides checks and balances
for one another but must not usurp the powers carefully allocated to another
branch, nor exercise control over another branch.164 According to Alexander
Hamilton, the permanency of judicial appointments is the "citadel of the public
justice and the public security" and essential to the maintenance of judicial
independence.165
Hamilton also reasoned that "[p]eriodical appointments,
however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be
fatal to [the judiciary's] necessary independence."l66
Nevertheless, South
Carolina continues to operate under a judicial selection model that relies on
periodic selections and muddies the boundaries between the legislative and
judicial branches of the state's government, with the General Assembly retaining
practical control over the judiciary. 167
Currently, the JMSC has the power to appoint and nominate judicial
candidates which, at first glance, appears to retain the independent nature of
the process.168 However, this process violates the separation of powers principle
because three legislators the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the President Pro Tempore of
the Senate hold the power to nominate commission members.169 Thus, these
three legislators retain enormous control and influence over South Carolina's
judiciary, which could lead to future abuses of the system.170 The three
legislators are undoubtedly products and beacons of partisan politics acting out
of necessity to obtain political success. 1
Conversely, a governor's work
requires working with both parties to successfully accomplish an agenda. 172In
the most recent election, the brother of the Speaker of the House sat on the
screening panel for both candidates for chief justice.173 This seemingly minor
overlap may signal the beginning of these three legislators' abuses of power.

162. See, e.g., id. at 707 & n.2 (discussing a constitutional amendment proposed by James
Madison that expressly separated the branches of government (citing Brown, supra note 163, at
1539)).
163. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 338 (James Madison).
164. See id. at 337 38 ("There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers
are united in the same person, or body of magistrates, or, if the power of judging be not separated
from the legislative and executive powers ..... (internal quotation marks omitted)).
165. See id. at 491 (Alexander Hamilton).
166. Id. at 495.
167. See supra notes 63, 69 73, 130 35, 138-39 and accompanying text.
168. See Driggers,supra note 25, at 1230 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-19-80(B) (2005)).
169. See id. at 1231 (citing § 2-19- 10(B)).
170. Id.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 1231.
173. See Brundrett, supra note 44.
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Additionally, the current allocation of power to three experienced legislators
creates a substantial likelihood that the JMSC may be warped into another tool
of partisan politics with a distinctly political agenda for the judicial nominees.174
Thus far, the JMSC's nominations have mostly been nonpartisan. 1 5 In fact,
under the 1996 system, there has been a substantial increase in the number of
candidates without prior legislative experience

with 57.73% of candidates

without legislative experience filing to run for a judicial position from 1975 to
1996, versus 84.85% of candidates without legislative experience filing to run
for a judicial position from 1997 to 2004.176 The recent showdown, however,
has drawn lines and tested political alliances in the General Assembly, which
demonstrates just how quickly forward progress can unravel.1
Despite the increase in judicial candidates who have not served as
legislators, legislative experience remains a significant factor in determining
South Carolina's judicial elections. 1 8 Additionally, the bench's past reputation
as a retirement center for legislators makes this factor a very real concern for
South Carolina's future.179 One judge observed that "[a]ny attempt to make the
courts partisan . . . is, at best, a misconception of the judicial role and, at worst,
an effort to prostitute the courts and subvert their assigned function ... .,,
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The 1996 reform has not remedied the problems that plague South
Carolina's judicial system.181 Therefore, South Carolina should eliminate
legislative judicial elections in favor of a selection system similar to the federal
model.182 In particular, South Carolina's Governor should appoint members to
the judiciary with confirmation hearings in the General Assembly. These judges

174. See Driggers,supra note 25, at 1231.
175. But see id. at 1232 (explaining how party allegiances could become important after the
nominations are made).
176. See Ritchie, supra note 8, at 30 (quoting remarks made by Senator Glenn McConnell on
June 2, 2005).
177. See generally Monk, supra note 3, at Al (quoting state Senator Joel Lourie, a Democrat
representing Richland County: "In my 16 years of service, this is probably one of the most
competitive races I've experienced. Both sides think they have the edge, which to me means it's
too close to call.").
178. Ritchie, supra note 8, at 30 (quoting remarks made by Glenn McConnell on June 2,
2005).
179. See id. at 27.
180. Driggers, supra note 25, at 1221 (quoting William H. Hastie, JudicialRole and Judicial
Image, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 947, 951 (1973)).
181. See Cosby, supra note 125, at 128 ("Periods of time when [South Carolina's] system has
worked moderately well in selecting qualified judges are, at best, byproducts of happenstance, not
the results of a well-designed selection method."); supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
182. See Croley, supra note 10, at 692-93.
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should have lifetime tenure1 83 because the previously discussed mechanisms for
countering unpopular judicial decisions or engendering impeachment trials still
exist within the state model. 18 4
Currently, South Carolina faces a very practical problem: a lack of public
trust in its most recent governors. 8 5 Therefore, the public and the General
Assembly may be hesitant to increase the power of that office. If that remains
the case, then South Carolina should move to a modified version of the Missouri
Plan and retain the JMSC. Similar to some versions of the Missouri Plan, this
modified version would move the recommendations of the JMSC to the
Governor rather than the General Assembly. 18 6 The modified version would
remove retention elections, replacing these elections with lifetime appointments
for judges who may be removed only through impeachment trials.s1 8
If, however, the South Carolina General Assembly refuses to give up this
control once again, a series of minor reforms set forth in a variety of sources may
help alleviate some of the issues with the judicial system if implemented as a
comprehensive reform package. Indeed, "[t]he task for reformers is to locate
their system's particular vulnerabilities and to design a programme [sic] that
deals with the multiple facets of independence in a way that limits corrupt
incentives and provides prompt and impartial justice."
With this need for a
solution tailored to the unique issues and history of the state's judicial system,
South Carolina should adopt more specific provisions addressing discrimination
in the JMSC's nominating process.189 Moreover, South Carolina should increase
the length of terms between retention elections to further increase the
independence of the judiciary from the General Assembly. 190

183. See generally Mary Noel Pepys, Corruption Within the Judiciary: Causes and Remedies,
in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supra note 39, at 7 (discussing the importance of lifetime
tenure for judges).
184. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
185. See generally Andrew Shain, 2014 Governor's Race: Sheheen Ahead of Haley, THE
STATE, Dec. 12, 2012, at BI (quoting gubernatorial candidate Senator Vincent Sheheen attributing
his success in the polls over Governor Nikki Haley to "the distrust the people of South Carolina
have in state government").
186. See generally Eberle, supra note 46, at 22 (discussing the different variations of the
merit-based system); supra Part III.C.
187. See generally Pepys, supra note 183, at 7 (discussing how the security of tenure, with
removal only for misconduct, can enhance the independence of the judiciary).
188. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Judicial Independence and Corruption, in GLOBAL
CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supra note 39, at 24.
189. See generally Cosby, supra note 125, at 75 ("[S]tates should implement a method to
choose judges that structurally promotes judicial independence and also respects the diversity and
interests of its citizens."). States that allow campaign accounts should provide candidates with the
opportunity to obtain public grants for their election campaigns, rather than requiring personal or
special interest group funding. See generally Roy A. Schotland, Judicial Elections in the United
States: Is Corruption an Issue?, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supra note 39, at 30
(discussing the possibility of public funding for judicial campaigns).
190. See id. at 30.
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To avoid the appearance of impropriety and comport with the constitutional
requirements of due process, South Carolina should clearly identify procedures
and standards for the recusal of judges. 191 These standards should then be
publicized to increase judicial accountability.192 Finally, the courts should help
create training on legal principles for the media.193 This training would allow the
media to better identify defects in the legal system and incidents of political
corruption that may occur from overlap between the judiciary and the General
Assembly. 194 Further, the media's recognition of these problems could provide
grounds for impeachment trials when necessary.
VI. CONCLUSION

The rule of law and democracy itself are endangered when the judicial
branch is beholden to electoral majorities. 195 Additional concerns exist because,
generally, the qualities associated with a good judge are far from the qualities
associated with a successful campaigner.
The integrity and independence of
the judiciary has been the cornerstone to America's success in its creation of a
new form of government.197 In South Carolina, however, the General Assembly
continues to stifle this success through its perversion of and control over the
judicial branch. 19 The road to judicial independence in America was paved long
ago, but in South Carolina this road remains paved with gravel as the General
Assembly hinders the path to true justice and an independent judiciary.199
Samantha R. Wilder

191. See Pepys, supra note 183, at 9 (discussing how codes of conduct can "strengthen the
integrity of judges and improve public perception of the courts").
192. See generally id. at 14 ("The perception of corruption can be as insidious as actual
corruption since both have the same effect of undermining public trust in the justice system.
Judiciaries have much to gain by increasing transparency of their operations.").
193. Robertson QC, supra note 39, at 109.
194. Id. ("But the greatest advantage of such training is that it would improve their ability to
detect defects in the legal system and incidents of venality or political corruption in the
professionals who operate it.").
195. Croley, supra note 10, at 787.
196. Id. at 783.
197. See Rehnquist, supra note 17, at 579.
198. See supra Part IV.C.
199. Shepherd, supra note 48, at 5 (quoting former Justice Leah Ward Sears, Georgia Supreme
Court: "Without justice we have no rights, no peace, and no prosperity. Judicial independence is
the cornerstone ofjustice. This means that judges, who are empowered to ensure that justice always
reigns supreme, must never be beholden to any particular political party or special interest group.
Nor should they have favored financial backers. Their only 'constituency' must be the law and the
law alone. You need only open your daily newspaper to the international section to read about
countries where judicial independence doesn't exist to see how bad things can become.").
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